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Talk of restoring the shah’s monarchy has surged since the start of the US-Israeli war against Iran two weeks ago, more than at any time since the fall of the Pahlavi regime in the late 1970s.

Estimates suggest about one-third of Iranians support the return of Reza Pahlavi, the shah’s son, though such figures are debated. Some believe the true number might be even higher, driven by the failure of the current religious system.

Yet Iran might instead be heading toward a different form of hereditary rule; Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed by a strike in the early stages of the conflict, has reportedly been chosen over other religious figures as his father’s successor. The rise of “Khamenei II” leads to a similar outcome: it might not be a monarchy but it is still hereditary rule, one that lacks the traditional legitimacy associated with dynastic succession.

Most likely, this is an attempt to resolve the crisis facing Iran’s institutional religious system, which suffers from having multiple competing centers of decision-making and overlapping authority.

The state is governed by several bodies that emerged during different stages of the regime’s development. These include the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Supreme Council of the Religious Seminaries, and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. Alongside them stand powerful decision-making centers such as the Office of the Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council.

Above all is the most influential force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has evolved from merely implementing decisions into a partner in shaping them.

The accumulation of these institutions has marginalized state bodies considered “legitimate” under the constitution, such as the presidency and the government. Over time, other countries came to realize that presidents such as Mohammed Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani had gradually become little more than public faces for the other forces that truly govern this large, influential and potentially dangerous state in the region.

These competing centers of power and internal political struggles had long threatened to create dangerous divisions that could endanger the republic, posing risks to the regime’s survival no less serious than the threat now posed by war itself.

Within less than a decade, several key pillars of the system have disappeared or been sidelined. Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi remain under house arrest after playing roles in street protests against the late supreme leader. Former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani died, and his family believe he was poisoned. Ahmadinejad, said to be highly popular among the public, was punished and marginalized, as was Rouhani. President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in 2024. And in 2020, rising star Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Qud’s Force, was killed by a US drone strike.

In addition, a long list of military leaders have vanished from the scene as a result of last year’s war against Israel and the current conflict.

Within less than a decade, several key pillars of the Iranian system have disappeared or been sidelined.

If hereditary leadership within the religious establishment continues, and the new supreme leader survives Israeli targeting, Iran might shift the concept of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist) toward a different system of rule centered largely on the personality of the leader.

Such nonmonarchical hereditary rule is not unique in the world; North Korea has been ruled by three members of the Kim family for more than seven decades, and Cuba was governed for years by the Castro family.

In Tehran, the ruling religious establishment appears to have reached the conclusion that this is the way to proceed because it had arrived at a dead end and found itself increasingly pressured by public discontent. The rise of Khamenei II might become the rope that pulls the regime back from the brink, if it chooses to transform into a peaceful civilian system. At present, however, the system remains both religious and military in nature.

It is widely rumored that Mojtaba is more hard line than his father and the region may need to prepare for a more turbulent and chaotic era. But this might be little more than speculation; we should not rely solely on the brief biography of a largely unknown figure to judge him.

The region itself is also changing, compared with the era of his father, especially in light of the war fought last year and the current conflict.

In fact, Ali Khamenei himself was more hard line than his predecessor, Ayatollah Khomeini, despite claims to the contrary. It was Khamenei who built Iran’s modern system of extremism. During his rule, the Revolutionary Guard expanded into vast military and economic institutions with extensive external networks. The concept of regional proxy forces emerged, turning groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi militias, the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade, and the Houthis in Yemen into forward military arms of the republic. Iran’s nuclear program also took shape during his tenure.

Khamenei was known for his rigidity. Khomeini, by contrast, had agreed to end the war with Saddam Hussein, a decision he famously described as “drinking poison,” reflecting his sense of political realism.

Khamenei, however, insisted on pressing ahead with all of his projects despite their failure to achieve the intended goals. This continued until the events of Oct. 7, 2023, which became the final straw and he ultimately pushed forward with a confrontation against the Trump administration despite the massive US military buildup off Iran’s shores.

Does this mean Khamenei II will follow exactly in his father’s footsteps or choose a different path? Both possibilities remain open, given that he lived and worked at the center of power. But that does not necessarily mean he will simply replicate his father’s approach, especially in light of the new conditions created by war and the shifts in Iranian public sentiment that preceded it.

Abdulrahman Al-Rashed is a Saudi journalist and intellectual. 

This article was originally published on Arab News.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.