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Geography and a history of proxy politics have made Afghanistan an arena for others’ contests, undermining its stability. Internal fragmentation has compounded the damage. Regional rivalries have repeatedly undermined Afghan-led efforts toward peace.

These rivalries have included those between Pakistan and India and between Iran and the Gulf States. Intensifying US–China competition and US tensions with Russia and Iran have also been factors.

The rivalries that robbed Afghanistan of peace began during the Cold War and persisted through the 1979 Soviet invasion, the rise of extremism, and the US-led intervention of 2001 to 2021. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and, later, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—a regional branch of Daesh—each emerged as a direct consequence of these interventions and their unintended outcomes. They emerged first during the Soviet invasion, the US-supported jihad against the Soviets, and later during the War on Terror in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

Today, Afghanistan is once again trapped in a cycle of geopolitical tensions. Shifting alliances and rivalries evoke the old game, but with some new players.

External actors have consistently prioritised their own security and strategic interests over Afghanistan’s peace and stability. Pakistan pursued strategic depth in Afghanistan against India; Iran and Russia viewed the Taliban as a hedge against ISKP and a potential destabilising force; and China eyed Afghanistan’s mineral and transit potential in the Belt and Road Initiative, while monitoring security risks related to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

Meanwhile, the United States oscillated between counterterrorism and state-building, ending in a hasty withdrawal without a political settlement. There is no doubt that between 2001 and 2021, despite ongoing conflict, significant progress was made in education, health, infrastructure, private sector growth, media and improvements in rights. These achievements were highly valued, but progress was reversed after the collapse of the republic following the US withdrawal.

Even US officials have since questioned the decision to leave Afghanistan. President Donald Trump said that leaving Bagram Air Base had been a mistake—a point that continues to stir geopolitical debate.

Each phase of intervention under peace agreements, including the 1988 Geneva Accords and the 2020 Doha Agreement, was shaped more by external timelines than by Afghanistan’s institutional capacity. This left Kabul without the consensus or legitimacy required for political settlement and durable peace.

For two decades, Pakistan’s policy of supporting the Taliban to secure influence in Afghanistan proved counterproductive, fostering instability across the region. Several Pakistani leaders have publicly acknowledged this failure. In July 2021, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said in parliament, ‘The strategic depth policy [in Afghanistan] should be abandoned, as it proved to be wrong.’ And in October 2025, he further noted that Pakistan’s support for the Taliban—by hosting refugees and facilitating its rise to power—was met ‘with aggression and ingratitude.’ He even went further, accusing the Taliban of fighting a proxy war on behalf of Delhi, irritated by a visit of the Taliban foreign minister to Delhi.

Similarly, during a 2007 meeting with then Afghan president Hamid Karzai, Pakistan’s prime minister Benazir Bhutto said, ‘Supporting the Taliban was a big mistake,’ recognising that the movement failed to deliver stability. In May 2018, former army chief Qamar JavedBajwa also acknowledged in a meeting I attended as part of a delegation of senior security ministers that ‘We have learned from the past to evolve and are willing to move ahead towards a new future.’

Despite these admissions, Islamabad’s policies continue to rely on coercive tactics and proxy influence, now fuelling further clashes between Pakistan and the Taliban, closures at Torkham and Chaman crossings, and strikes in Kabul and Kandahar —all of which exacerbate instability.

Two major US miscalculations also shaped Afghanistan’s downfall: building Afghan forces as dependent replicas of US military structures; and sequencing withdrawal before a political settlement was secured. The US special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction concluded that ‘The decision by two US presidents to withdraw US military forces … fundamentally altered every subsequent decision … and accelerated the collapse of the [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces],’ while the US–Taliban deal had ‘degraded morale’ and removed critical air and maintenance support.

Analysts similarly judge the Doha Agreement as ‘flawed’ and ‘disastrous for Afghans’, because it legitimised the Taliban’s key demand—total US withdrawal—without enforceable guarantees on rights or a ceasefire. The Taliban, in turn, failed to uphold their commitments to form an inclusive, constitutional government and protect women’s rights.

These rivalries and failures have directly hindered the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2721, which remains stalled due to divisions among global and regional powers. The resolution was based on an independent assessment by FeridunSinirlioglu, which outlined a comprehensive roadmap following extensive consultation with Afghan stakeholders.

Without alignment among key powers, Afghanistan’s normalisation and reconciliation remain elusive, perpetuating ungoverned spaces in the tribal regions. That governance vacuum enables groups including ISKP, al-Qaeda, the Pakistan Taliban and other regional extremist groups, and exacerbates security and humanitarian crises across Afghanistan and the region.

To reverse Afghanistan’s tragic trajectory, four interlinked steps are essential:

—Empower the UN to implement UNSCR2721, including appointing a special envoy to advance political dialogue;

—Facilitate intra-Afghan dialogue to create an inclusive, legitimate and constitutional political system, guaranteeing the rights of all citizens;

—Foster a UN-mediated regional compact reframing security dilemmas into cooperative opportunities in trade, counterterrorism, water management and narcotics control; and

—Leverage emerging global consensus on core issues—including governance, counterterrorism, human rights, and women’s education and employment—to advance constructive diplomacy and dialogue.

Despite external countries’ geopolitical frictions, their cooperation around areas of common interest can and will transform Afghanistan into a place for cooperation rather than confrontation.

Afghans must reclaim ownership of their destiny, building a national consensus that prioritises peace over politics, and the future over revenge. The path forward lies not in external patronage but in Afghan-led cooperation supported by regional goodwill and reinvigorated international efforts.

Masoom Stane kzai is an honorary fellow at the Asia Institute of Melbourne University and a former chief peace negotiator and minister of the Afghan Republic Government.

This article was originally published on The Strategist.
\Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.