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The Rise of Far-Right Tendencies: A Troubled Awakening

In the aftermath of Sheikh Hasina’s fall through the July Uprising 2024, Bangladesh appears to be experiencing a visible rise in far-right tendencies spanning religious, social, and cultural spheres. While such currents have long existed in varying forms, recent incidents suggest a renewed intensity and visibility. Acts such as vandalizing mazars, disrupting folk concerts, and harassing women over “immodest” attire point to a growing atmosphere of moral anxiety and social tension.

Women have faced humiliation, intimidation, and public-shaming, often justified as defending “religious values.” Extremist rhetoric floods social media, framing dissents as immoral and liberalism as blasphemous. Despite India’s role as a global disinformation hub, many Bangladeshis mislabel genuine local incidents as “Indian propaganda,”. Ironically, this denial rather strengthens offenders and fuels India’s narrative that Bangladesh risks Islamist anarchy without Sheikh Hasina. In doing so, society digs its own stability, sustaining unrest through populist delusion and the erosion of law.

Mapping the Symptoms: Visible Incidents and Tendencies

Since the regime’s fall, far-right forces have expanded their visibility, targeting cultural spaces and vulnerable groups. Reports confirm over 150 shrine attacks since August 2024, including vandalism of sacred sites central to Bangladesh’s syncretic identity. Folk concerts have been disrupted, women’s football matches cancelled under clerical pressure, and theatre events suspended following threats. In Chittagong, a famous actress invited to inaugurate a shop was forced to call-off her visit after unrest emerged upon news of her arrival, while a few temples were also broken sporadically, although not in systematic manner like the mazars, yet producing terrible consents for such acts. All these incidents, including postponed football matches and cultural programs, were led by mobs claiming to “protect Islam” under the banner of so-called “TaohidiJonota”.However, many respected Islamic scholars and religious leaders have publicly disagreed with these actions, emphasizing that Islam stands for peace, tolerance, and respect for diversity, and warning against the misuse of faith to justify violence or intimidation.

Equally alarming is the rise of moral policing and misogynistic rhetoric. A mob pressured police to release a man accused of harassing a Dhaka University student, by forcing her to wear her scarf “properly.” Upon release, he was greeted with flowers and a Qur’an, glorified for “moral correction.” Two women were attacked in Mohammadpur for smoking; a women’s reform commission report was condemned as “anti-Islamic,” and at a procession led by a religious group, women activists were branded “prostitutes.” Even an education reform proposing music teachers in schools was scrapped under extremist pressure. Together, these acts expose a systematic rollback of pluralism and civic freedom.

Why They Are Rising: Roots of Far-Right Expansion

The far-right surge stems from deep cracks in governance and social cohesion. The vacuum following the regime’s fall, alongside weak policing and institutional hesitation, allowed groups to impose their version of order. Economic distress, including inflation, poverty, and unemployment,has fuelled anger among disillusioned youth, who find solace in simplistic narratives promising purity and control.

Equally corrosive is the collapse of trust in socio-political institutions. Years of corruption and impunity convinced citizens that democracy failed to deliver justice. In this void, self-styled defenders of faith emerged as arbiters of morality. The interim government, reactive and populist, acts only when outrage goes viral. Its silence otherwise emboldens extremists, letting coercion masquerade as religious virtue.

How They Flourished: Historical Roots and Authoritarian Repercussions

The far-right upsurge is rooted not in religion but in decades of inequality, intolerance, and alienation. Under Awami League’s secular authoritarianism, aggressive secularism often slid into Islamophobia, alienating ordinary believers. State-aligned institutions equated Islamic identity with extremism to justify repression and satisfy Western and Indian narratives.

Thousands of Islamists faced enforced-disappearance or extrajudicial-killing. The ShaplaChattar massacre in 2013 and later crackdowns during anti-Modi protests deepened huge resentment. These years of suppression fostered bitterness that now resurfaces in a fragile post-authoritarian environment. Today’s radical outbursts are not new creations but echoes of accumulated frustration, the backlash of systematic marginalization.

Post-Authoritarian Lens: The Unintended Consequences

Bangladesh’s post-authoritarian phase reveals a paradox: freedom from repression has enabled both democratic expression and moral disorder. The fall of Hasina’s regime ended centralized control but unleashed long-suppressed rage. Far-right groups now exploit this vacuum, claiming legitimacy as guardians of faith and order.

Mob attacks on women, disrupted cultural events, and assaults on artists embody this dangerous moral reawakening. The interim government, overwhelmed by crises, has failed to balance liberty with justice. As seen in Egypt and Libya, such vacuums invite ideological takeovers. Without civic education, accountability, and equitable governance, freedom risks mutating into a coercive, society-driven righteousness.

The Role of the Interim Government and the Politics of Populist Reaction

After the July Uprising, when state institutions had largely collapsed, the law enforcement agencies remained inactive for several days. The police, morally shaken and discredited for their role in abuses under the Sheikh Hasina regime, withdrew from public duties, creating a severe vacuum in maintaining order. During this period, the Interim Government struggled to stabilize itself amid administrative chaos and a volatile public mood. Although it faced immense structural and logistical challenges, the absence of early decisive measures allowed opportunistic groups to fill the void, projecting their own version of authority under the guise of moral or religious legitimacy.

The interim government’s continued inability to restore effective governance has deepened instability nationwide. Since 2024, intolerance has been intensified significantly as a massive outburst of repressed emotions. In Rajbari’s Goalando, a mob exhumed and burned the body of mystic NuraPagla, additionally killing a disciple who tried to defend him. Another individual’s hair was publicly cut in the name of “moral correction,” while mobs slaughtered cows outside two newspaper offices accused of being “Indian propaganda machineries.”

These crimes often go unpunished unless populist outrage erupts. The Magura rape case of 8-year-old Asia saw swift arrests only after protests, yet most assaults remain ignored. In the Dhaka University harassment case, police freed the offender under pressure; he was later celebrated with garlands and a Qur’an, glorified as a moral hero. Justice only ensured when populism demands, which is gradually crumbling faith in governance and emboldens moral vigilantism.

Conclusion: The Fragile Fabric of a Divided Transition

Bangladesh’s post-authoritarian journey stands delicately poised between liberty and disorder. The fall of an autocratic regime created space for expression but also exposed deep fractures. The rise of far-right vigilantism and misogynistic populism signals a struggle over the nation’s moral core.

The interim government’s selective, popularity-driven governance has turned justice into spectacle. Instead of building accountability and civic tolerance, it allows mob sentiment to define morality. Bangladesh now reflects the post-authoritarian paradox: the fall of tyranny has not ensured freedom but unleashed suppressed fears cloaked as virtue. Whether this turbulence evolves into democratic renewal or collapses into populist moral order will determine the nation’s future.

Disclaimer: Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy