The Missing Conversation in US-Bangladesh Relations

Zillur Rahman | 24 October 2026
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THE trade agreement between Bangladesh and the United States in February 2026 was not just about tariffs. It dealt with labour rights, digital trade, regulatory practices and economic security. These terms affect domestic and international decisions long after negotiations end. However, the public debate over the trade agreement highlighted one issue that deserves attention: how much room there is for independent analysis of bilateral agreements before they are concluded.

The agreement was reached on February 9, a few days before Bangladesh’s national election. According to the US Trade Representative, it was a step towards a more reciprocal economic relationship, a good goal for both countries. However, economists and civil society representatives raised other questions about the agreement’s implications. At least, the executive director (currently distinguished fellow) of the Centre for Policy Dialogue, Fahmida Khatun, who attended a consultation, said in her assessment that the exercise of consultation with economists was mostly procedural rather than substantive.

The consultations, however, did take place. The issue is whether the process allowed them to influence negotiations. The distinction matters. Inviting experts to a discussion is not the same as giving them an opportunity to shape policies.

In May, the government of Bangladesh decided to review the agreement rather than cancel it right away. In June, US ambassador Brent Christensen said that public discussion and scrutiny are essential to the policy-making process. These two approaches do not contradict each other. They suggest there is room for a more informed discussion about implementation, obligations and mutual benefits.

What is missing in the relationship between the United States and Bangladesh, then, is not the communication process itself. It is a reliable connection between official negotiations and independent scrutiny: the one that allows challenging assumptions, suggesting alternative courses of action and continuing the process even after a particular agreement is signed.

I saw the possibilities and limitations of such exchanges in journalism. In May 2023, only a few hours after the announcement of the visa policy for Bangladesh in relation to elections, I conducted an interview with then US Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu on Tritiyo Matra. It helped the audience understand the US position without going through the mediation of any diplomat or official. However, a television interview is not enough for the sustained exchange needed to explore disagreements from various angles.

We should not underestimate the role of existing forums for discussing these issues. The 2013 Trade and Investment Cooperation Forum Agreement established a formal platform to discuss bilateral economic issues. Security discussions, educational exchanges, university partnerships and business organisations also play an essential role. All these achievements should be recognised. The question is what they fail to resolve.

Government officials negotiate agreement terms for the government, and business groups promote commercial interests. Their work is essential but different from that of researchers, journalists, academics and independent policy institutes. The latter can compare evidence, raise questions, not necessarily on the negotiation agenda, and consider the long-term consequences of a policy decision.

This becomes especially important when the issues of trade come together with the issues of strategy. Washington has its own priorities regarding markets, investment and economic security. The government of Bangladesh should consider these issues considering employment, industrial development and the country’s relationships with Asian and other countries. Interests may differ, but they need not conflict. To understand where they can meet and where they cannot, more than diplomatic statements are needed.

Track 1.5 and Track 2 diplomacy are quite useful in this case. Track 1.5 brings government officials and non-government experts into less formal discussions, while Track 2 brings independent participants into discussions without asking them to represent their governments’ interests. These approaches do not replace leaders of the two countries or official negotiators. The value of these methods lies in testing options without requiring immediate agreement.

However, another meeting is not the answer in itself. A more useful approach would be a small, ongoing policy dialogue between the United States and Bangladesh, with the participation of universities and independent institutes in both countries. It could address one practical problem at a time: implementing trade commitments, investment and skills opportunities, labour standards, technology cooperation or the future of the Bay of Bengal. Invite young scholars, industry experts and representatives of labour unions.

The test would be follow-through. Each discussion should result in a short evidence-based report outlining common points of view, unanswered questions and options for policymakers. Participant selection and funding should be transparent. Governments could contribute their expertise without shaping the conclusions. Private discussion might allow for more candour, whereas public reports would ensure accountability.

Such a method would benefit both countries. American officials would have a chance to hear more voices from Bangladesh, including those that differ from the official position or commercial assessment. For Bangladesh, the challenge is in contributing their side. The independent dialogue would not work if it became a mere way of flattering the Americans or Bangladeshis.

The point is not to avoid disagreements. Divergent interests among sovereign countries are normal, and some are inevitable regardless of how many discussions are held. The point is to make them more informed, less prone to misunderstandings and more open to resolution.

The sustainable relationship between the United States and Bangladesh will require government initiative and commercial benefits. It will also require people and institutions willing to ask the hard questions before important decisions become fixed.

Zillur Rahman is a political analyst and President of the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS). He hosts Tritiyo Matra on Channel i and writes on geopolitics, strategic affairs and governance. Follow him on X: @zillur.

This article was published on the Newage.com
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.



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