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BANGLADESH is passing through one of the most sensitive diplomatic transitions in its recent history. After more than 15 years of Awami League rule, prime minister Tarique Rahman and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party took charge in February 2026, and a political shift of this scale was always going to bring a new foreign policy environment with it. Old assumptions are being reviewed, relationships are being recalibrated and every major diplomatic move is now read as a signal of where Dhaka intends to stand.

Bangladesh’s present position resists a straight line. The China leg of prime minister Tarique Rahman’s first overseas tour, after Malaysia, drew attention because he met president Xi Jinping and premier Li Qiang in Beijing this June. At the same time, Dhaka has deepened ties with Washington. The reciprocal trade agreement that the interim administration signed with the United States in February has since been carried forward with a $3.7 billion Biman deal for 14 Boeing aircraft, an energy cooperation memorandum and a long-term LNG purchase deal with an American supplier. Calling Bangladesh ‘pro-China’ for Beijing or ‘pro-US’ for these deals misses how diplomacy works today.

India makes the situation more complicated. Relations have stayed strained since Sheikh Hasina fled to India in August 2024, partly because many Bangladeshis saw Delhi as too close to the fallen Awami League. Ties were tested again when Hasina addressed the media from Delhi on August 5, which Dhaka called an affront to its sovereignty. A possible visit of the prime minister to India has since become entangled with these disputes. Bangladesh has also said that it would view the Mecca defence pact positively if invited to join while India says that it is watching developments closely.

These overlapping relationships show why the language of permanent friends and permanent enemies is increasingly inadequate. Washington and New Delhi cooperate strategically, yet Washington also engages Islamabad. Bangladesh can expand cooperation with China while buying American aircraft and energy, and have political disputes with India while staying deeply connected to its economy and transport networks. This is the logic of a more multipolar, issue-based order, where strategic autonomy depends on knowing where to cooperate, where to hedge and where to say no.

The government has chosen ‘Bangladesh first’ as the guiding language of its foreign policy. That principle will matter only if Bangladesh builds the capacity to translate national interest into bargaining power. Smaller states face structural disadvantages, but negotiation is not decided by size alone. Preparation, data, coalition-building, institutional memory and a clear understanding of the other side’s interests can all shift the bargaining equation.

Bangladesh’s diplomatic challenge has often been less about lacking strategic importance and more about failing to communicate it. For years, the dominant narrative has been that Bangladesh needs India more than India needs Bangladesh. Bangladesh certainly needs a stable, cooperative relationship with its largest neighbor, but mature diplomacy must also show how India, China, the United States and other partners benefit from a stable, prosperous Bangladesh. With nearly 178 million people, a growing consumer market, access to the Bay of Bengal and a location between South and Southeast Asia, Bangladesh holds assets beyond the usual development conversation, from India’s trade and transit interests to China’s connectivity ambitions and America’s Indo-Pacific calculations. Diplomacy is not only about explaining what Bangladesh needs from others. It is also about showing why Bangladesh matters to them.

This requires stronger diplomatic capacity. Official diplomacy remains the foundation of international relations, but modern diplomacy increasingly runs through multiple channels. Track 1 is formal government to government engagement. Track 1.5 creates space where officials and non-government experts interact. Track 2 brings in academics, think tanks, former diplomats, retired military officers, business leaders and civil society actors who build relationships and shape policy ideas outside formal negotiations. Track 3  works through people to people contact and grassroots links. Together, the channels widen the information, relationships and policy options open to a state.

Bangladesh already has experiences of Track 2 diplomacy. The CPD-led Kunming Initiative, which grew into the BCIM process involving Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar, began in 1999 as an unofficial dialogue among experts before moving towards an intergovernmental framework. Institutions such as BEI, BIPSS and BIISS have also contributed to regional and bilateral dialogues over the years. Elsewhere in Asia, the ASEAN-ISIS network of think tanks played a similar role in shaping what became the ASEAN Regional Forum, showing that unofficial channels can help build official architecture.

The trouble is that Bangladesh has not yet built a permanent Track 2 architecture of its own. Many dialogues stay dependent on individual projects, personalities or political circumstances. Recommendations often fail to move from the discussion room into a sustained policy process. A mature Track 2  ecosystem needs continuity, institutional memory and a working relationship between independent expertise and official diplomacy.

Other countries have understood the value of such platforms. India’s Raisina Dialogue is hosted by the ORF together with the ministry of external affairs. Singapore hosts the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, where ministers, military leaders and experts meet in public and closed sessions. Germany has built the Munich Security Conference over six decades while Qatar has turned the Doha Forum into a major platform for diplomacy. Each has strengthened the convening power of its host country.

Bangladesh has a similar opportunity in the Bay of Bengal Conversation. Since 2022, the Centre for Governance Studies has organised Bay of Bengal Conversation as a platform bringing together former heads of state and government, ministers, policymakers, diplomats, academics, journalists, business leaders and civil society figures from around the world. My own work with this initiative showed how difficult independent diplomatic convening can still be in Bangladesh. During its first edition under the Awami League government, several expected government participants stayed away, and CGS later spoke publicly about the pressure and obstruction it faced. The fifth edition, to be held in Dhaka on October 5, will draw participants from more than 100 countries and give Bangladesh another chance to build its role as a platform for regional and global dialogue.

The state should keep strengthening its professional diplomats while allowing think tanks, former officials, universities, business networks and civil society to build their own international relationships, with transparency and independence intact. A foreign connection should not automatically be read as foreign allegiance. When national policy stays anchored in Bangladesh’s own interests, those networks can become channels of influence rather than sources of suspicion.

The next phase of Bangladeshi diplomacy will be judged by whether Dhaka can protect its interests without being trapped inside somebody else’s camp. Bangladesh needs strong relations with India, China, the United States, Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, which takes skilled diplomats and a broader diplomatic ecosystem where independent institutions can contribute ideas, build relationships and open space for dialogue. Track 2 diplomacy cannot replace the foreign ministry, but it can give official diplomacy more ideas, more relationships and more room to manoeuvre. In a fragmented international order, that added layer of diplomatic depth may be one of Bangladesh’s most valuable strategic assets.

Roman Uddin is a senior research associate at Centre for Governance Studies.

This article was originally published on Newage.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.