The world in 2026

Four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a peaceful settlement remains far from reach. As long as Vladimir Putin continues his extreme agenda to control not just Ukraine’s eastern regions but the entire country, Donald Trump’s negotiations alone are unlikely to stop him.  

The next year will be a battle of wills. Ukraine must adapt its economy to a protracted war and strengthen its industrial capacity to produce more weapons. It is equally vital that Ukraine wins the technological race in drone interception and gains deep-strike capabilities from European allies. Russia, meanwhile, continues to innovate. Its ballistic missiles, for example, are now better able to evade interceptors such as the US-made Patriot system. 

Can Europe’s ‘coalition of the willing’ become the ‘coalition of the capable’? The answer is crucial as the United States retreats further from the continent. To hold the line in 2026, Ukraine will need around $100 billion in military aid and financial support as well as access to the best military equipment. Sanctions on Russia must also be tightened. But to win the war, Kyiv will need far more.  

A key test will be whether the European Commission can move ahead with their preferred option to fund a €140 billion Reparation Loan to Ukraine, through unlocking frozen Russian sovereign assets. The funding proposal would allow Kyiv to procure and manufacture more weapons over the coming few years. Nato’s PURL initiative (Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List), which encourages member states to buy American weapon systems for Ukraine, also needs more money in 2026. So far, only $2 billion from 13 members has been pledged.  The Nato summit in Ankara in July could be a crucial moment to shore up these commitments and reach consensus over future security arrangements for Ukraine.  

Middle East: Uneasy peaces

This year will be a test of whether Middle East ceasefires can be a foundation for meaningful diplomacy and sustainable peace agreements. The US-brokered Gaza ceasefire in October offers a rare moment of respite for Palestinians devastated by two years of war and famine.

Donald Trump’s involvement in regional diplomacy applied much-needed pressure on both Israel and Hamas, yet uncertainty continues to overshadow a process that still lacks a detailed framework, a timeline and commitments from either side. Sustained international engagement – as well as political follow-through from regional powers, including the Gulf States – will be essential to transforming this ceasefire into a broader political and reconstruction process.

If Israel continues to focus on deterrence over diplomacy and a Palestinian peace process, its isolation will deepen in 2026. 

Sanam Vakil, director, Middle East and North Africa Programme.

Lebanon and Syria remain mired in institutional fragility, leaving both vulnerable to renewed conflict and further Israeli strikes. Lebanon’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for May 2026, could provide an opportunity to stabilize the internationally backed technocratic government. But despite direct negotiation between Israel and Lebanon, the unresolved questions over Hezbollah’s disarmament and Israel’s continued strikes in Lebanon persist.

Though Syria has completed its first parliamentary elections and violence has eased following the Suwayda attacks, reconstruction efforts are lagging. President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s landmark visit to the White House in November 2025 and the lifting of US sanctions may herald new economic opportunities for Syria.

Meanwhile, the spectre of another Israel–Iran confrontation looms after the 12-day war in June. Despite Israel’s limited appetite for talks, a fresh round of diplomacy with Tehran will be essential to preventing the resumption of Iran’s nuclear programme. If Israel continues to focus on deterrence over diplomacy and a Palestinian peace process, its isolation is likely to deepen in 2026. Elections will almost certainly be called in 2026, though it remains to be seen if Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can prevail over a field of divided opponents.

Sanam Vakil is director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme

China: Xi’s tech tilt

The trajectory of US–China relations should become clearer in 2026 as US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping plan reciprocal visits following the trade-war truce agreed in October. Although the American political and security establishment believes the US must prepare for decades of strategic competition with China, Trump sees Beijing as a partner with which he can do business, even as he deploys tactical threats to secure the short-term advantages.

Regardless of how Trump approaches Beijing, Xi is convinced that Washington is trying to constrain China in the long term. When the Chinese Communist Party launches its 15th Five-Year Plan in March, Xi is expected to accelerate China’s push for technological and industrial self-reliance, shielding his country from US-controlled chokepoints such as the highest-quality semiconductors.

The bumpy trajectory of US–China relations will affect the rest of the world, given the two nations’ unrivalled power and reach.

Ben Bland, director, Asia Pacific Programme.

The bumpy trajectory of US–China relations will affect the rest of the world, given the two nations’ unrivalled power and reach. That will be apparent as the two superpowers and India host key summits in 2026, with the BRICs meeting in India (date to be decided), Apec in China in November and the G20 in the US in December. 

Elsewhere in Asia, Bangladesh and Nepal are due to hold elections in the first quarter of the year, as they attempt to move on from their recent youth-led revolutions. The new leaders of Japan and South Korea, Prime Minister SanaeTakaichi and President Lee Jae-myung, will be trying to manage political polarization and sluggish economic growth at home while balancing complicated relations with the US and China.

Ben Bland is director of the Asia-Pacific Programme 

Britain: Friends without benefits

The British government will continue trying to strike a balance between the United States and Europe in the coming year, but domestic political problems – in both regions and within the UK itself – will make this increasingly difficult.

Following last February’s Munich Security Conference, in which US Vice President JD Vance downplayed the threat from Russia and excoriated European policies, the Labour government made a concerted effort to shore up European defence cooperation. It signed a new defence agreement with Germany and renewed its treaty with France. It also concluded a Security and Defence Partnership with the European Union in May. However, wrangling over UK contributions to EU funds and EU lending schemes to boost defence spending have slowed momentum since. 

Local elections in May may see hard-right populists Reform gain more power and deal a further blow to Starmer’s unpopular leadership. 

Olivia O’Sullivan, director of the UK in the World Programme.

As the current US administration continues to vacillate on its support for Ukraine and European security, Britain will look to intensify collaboration with European partners on common defence in the run-up to the 2026 EU–UK summit. Yet high public debt, domestic political deadlock and challenges from the populist right will make increasing defence spending and cooperating effectively tough for Europe’s three key economies – France, Germany and the UK. 

While the UK has had some short-term successes extracting concessions on tariffs from the Trump administration, its cautious renewal of some trade and research links with China may yet invite scrutiny – that is, if Trump himself is not distracted by US midterm elections and accusations his own administration has been too focused on deals abroad. Starmer will face his own challenges on this front, as local elections in Britain and elections to the Welsh Assembly in May may see hard-right populists Reform gain more power and deal a further blow to his unpopular leadership.

Olivia O’Sullivan is the director of the UK in the World Programme

Global economy: A post-tariff crash?

The big surprise for the global economy in 2025 was that Donald Trump actually did what he said he would in the US election campaign. So far, the world economy has suffered less than many predicted from such measures as raising the average US tariff rate to its highest level since the 1930s. The International Monetary Fund is forecasting growth of just over 3 per cent in 2026 and global equity markets recently touched all-time highs. 

This resilience is partly due to other countries choosing not to retaliate against US tariff hikes and continuing to trade with each other under World Trade Organization terms. Other offsetting factors include the AI investment boom in the US, the relaxation of Germany’s debt brake and a weakening US dollar. 

A key question for 2026 is whether these forces will continue to counterbalance the negative effects of Trump’s actions on the US and global economies. One scenario would see a sharp financial market correction, or even a crash – amplified by a retrenchment in private credit markets. A second question concerns the continuing relative weakness of Chinese growth. A combination of factors – including weak domestic demand, falling house prices, excessive domestic competition and growing overseas protection against heavily subsidized Chinese exports – could finally force the authorities to deploy the fiscal and monetary measures needed to boost domestic consumption. 

One potential bright spot is that Trump may be constrained in his use of tariffs by Supreme Court judgments and a switch to Democratic control of the US legislature in the November midterm elections. Another is the increasing determination of countries – other than the US and China – to cooperate in shoring up an open trading and investment system, using the preparations for the next WTO ministerial meeting in March 2026 as a launchpad.

Creon Butler is director of the Global Economy and Finance Programme

Artificial intelligence: Rethinking AI

In 2026, the promise of AI will be tested. Unsettled by under-delivery and sky-high valuations of major AI firms, markets will be turbulent. Labour disruption is expected but won’t hit all countries equally. As AI is adopted at a quicker rate in advanced economies, the impact on the workforce will be greater – affecting up to 60 per cent of jobs over the next decade. Despite this, inequalities will soar, as AI technology could help advanced economies boost productivity at up to twice the rate of lower-income countries. 

All the while, US and Chinese tech companies – such as OpenAI, Alibaba and newcomers like DeepSeek – will continue a relentless race to develop ever-more powerful AI. These countries, which already hold three out of four of the world’s AI supercomputers, will increase their colossal share of global AI capabilities. As the gap widens between the US, China and the rest, middle powers must wake up to the need to build technology infrastructure that serves the national interest. 

Throughout 2026, more of these states will work to reduce or reckon with their technological dependence on the two AI superpowers. India’s continued investment in digital public infrastructure – from digital IDs to payment systems – may encourage other middle-income countries to follow suit. Big questions linger over the future of global AI governance. In 2026, renewed efforts will be made to establish rules for monitoring and regulating powerful AI. In February, governments, companies, scientists and activists will try to move from discussion to action at the AI Impact Summit in New Delhi. In July, the UN’s new Global AI Dialogue will meet in Geneva for further talks. 

As these discussions progress, China’s vision for global AI governance – centred on protecting state sovereignty, promoting open-source systems and advancing Global South priorities – is likely to gain more traction, posing a challenge to US leadership on AI.

Isabella Wilkinson is a research fellow at the Digital Society Programme

Global health: Operating with less

Three important decisions in 2025 will ripple across the coming year: the widespread reduction in overseas development aid for health, the abrupt retreat of the United States from multilateral global health cooperation and the limited nature of the Pandemic Agreement made in May. 

For decades, the US was the leading donor to the World Health Organization, contributing more than $1.2 billion between 2022 and 2023. Although its withdrawal from the organization in January 2025 was not a surprise, the speed and scale of its broader reduction of development aid – slashing 80 per cent of USAID programmes – shocked the world. 

Negotiations were deferred over the most contentious part of the Pandemic Agreement – the deadline for agreement is May 2026.

Emma Ross, director of the Global Health Programme.

With other leading donor countries having to cut their development budgets in 2025, it remains to be seen to what extent multilateral funding instruments such as the Global Fund and the Pandemic Fund will continue to set the global health agenda. This uncertainty could lead to more bilateral relationships and encourage regional mechanisms to fill the funding gap. 

The coming year will also see the wider effects of President Trump’s America First Global Health Strategy. While countries adopted the Pandemic Agreement in May 2025, they deferred negotiations over its most substantive, and contentious, element – a system enabling rapid access to pathogens needed to develop tests, vaccines and therapies, and for equitable access to those products. May is the deadline for this system to be submitted and ratification of the agreement cannot begin until it has been adopted. But there are concerns that Trump’s bilateral ‘aid for pathogens’ deals could undermine progress. 

In September, the UN will convene its second High-Level Meeting on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response is scheduled. Its outcome will signal how far heads of state are willing to go on equity, financing and accountability for gaps in preparedness.

Emma Ross is director of the Global Health Programme 

Global America: Testing Pax Trumpiana

US President Donald Trump enters 2026 with bold pronouncements under his belt, but now confronts the reality of delivering on them. In this year, the 250th since the nation’s founding, his leadership will be tested as he seeks to sustain fragile ceasefires, navigate tense relations with Beijing and steer an increasingly volatile global economy.   

The anniversary of Trump’s inauguration on 20 January is the first of many milestones. In July, North America’s most consequential trade deal – between the US, Canada and Mexico – comes up for renegotiation. In November, the midterm elections could deliver a Democrat-controlled Senate or House, thereby limiting the power of the Executive. 

Trump’s planned state visit to Beijing this spring will offer a clearer direction of whether the two strategic rivals will agree to a new modus vivendi.

Laurel Rapp, director of US and North America Programme.

In 2025, Trump has touted his role as peacemaker in major crises – from Israel–Gaza to India–Pakistan to Armenia–Azerbaijan. These fragile accords will be tested in 2026, particularly in the Middle East as an international security force for Gaza is established. Trump’s erratic engagement with Russia’s Vladimir Putin is unlikely to resolve the war in Ukraine. Setbacks in these areas may dampen Trump’s appetite for direct involvement in negotiations, undermining his pursuit of a Nobel Peace Prize. 

Trump’s planned state visit to Beijing this spring will offer a clearer direction of whether the two strategic rivals will agree to a new modus vivendi. So far, the administration’s approach has been a study in contradictions, escalating economic pressure while offering national security give-aways on some advanced technologies, including semiconductors. Without a new strategy from Washington, we are in for a rollercoaster ride of tariff wars, military provocations and the bullying of partners seeking to maintain ties with Beijing. 

On a brighter note, the football World Cup kicks off in June in 16 cities across the US, Canada and Mexico. And if Nasa’s manned mission around the Moon goes as planned in 2026, the US will look forward to Americans (including a woman and a person of colour) returning there in 2027.

Laurel Rapp is director of US and North America Programme

Nuclear security: Expiring treaties, new peril

Big moments for nuclear stability loom in 2026.  New START, a nuclear arms treaty between Russia and the United States, is due to expire in February, leaving the countries without bilateral arms control for the first time in more than 50 years. Can the two most heavily nuclear-armed nuclear states find a way to extend the treaty informally? 

Iran’s nuclear programme will remain another flashpoint, after the US strikes in June failed to destroy its facilities. As Tehran inches towards weapons-grade uranium and diplomatic options narrow, the risk of renewed conflict between Iran and the US or its regional partners will grow in the coming year.  

The danger is not that the US will conduct a test in 2026, but that such rhetoric could give Russia or China the political cover to resume testing themselves.  

Joyce Hakmeh, deputy director of the International Security Programme.

China is believed to be expanding its arsenal rapidly and is said to be on course to reach 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. Though that would only be a fifth the size of Russia’s or the US’s, Beijing is shifting the strategic balance. No talks with Moscow and Washington are on the horizon, and each may use Beijing’s actions as a pretext to acquire more weapons. 

Meanwhile, President Trump’s announcement about the resumption of testing American nuclear weapons heightens the risk of escalation. The danger is not that the US will conduct a test in 2026 – that remains unlikely – but that such rhetoric could give Russia or China the political cover to resume testing themselves.  

In April and May, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference meets to assess the state of one of the most effective arms control agreements. The mood is likely to be fraught: will it produce meaningful recommitment to non-proliferation norms or expose terminal fractures in the regime? Emerging technologies are increasing this uncertainty. The integration of AI into military systems heightens the risks of accidents, while advances in quantum computing could break encryption that protects communications, early-warning systems and command links critical to the strategic stability of nuclear deterrence.  

Joyce Hakmeh is deputy director of the International Security Programme 

Climate action: Mitigation to adaptation 

The fallout from the United States’ blocking of international environmental agreements will extend well into 2026. The Global Plastics Treaty and a landmark agreement by the International Maritime Organization to cut shipping emissions will require substantial renegotiating as a result.

Washington’s absence from COP30 in Brazil this November was conspicuous, reducing moves towards decarbonization and the phasing out of fossil fuels. The conference revealed a shift of global priorities towards climate adaptation, reflecting a growing recognition that adapting to the changing climate is important for economic stability, national security and development planning. As the understanding of risk changes, the insurance sector will need to continue adjusting over the next year. 

The persistent shortfall in development and climate finance will deepen tensions between advanced economies and developing countries next year.

Ana Yang, director of the Environment and Society Centre.

COP30 helped bolster support for coalitions seeking to reduce emissions in agriculture, steel and other industries. Expect progress in 2026 on operational standards, increased investment and technology deployment. However, the persistent shortfall in development and climate finance will deepen tensions between advanced economies and developing countries over the distribution of energy transition costs. This friction will be particularly visible at the next COP summit in Antalya, Turkey, in November. 

The US tariff war has highlighted China’s dominance in critical mineral processing capacity – a potential chokepoint for the clean-energy transition if trade tensions persist. Competition for critical raw materials, land and water will intensify, prompting governments, including the UK’s, to keep pursuing diversification strategies to reduce these dependencies, and strengthen food and energy security.

Ana Yang is director of the Environment and Society Centre

Africa: Scramble for minerals

Intensifying global competition, louder public demands for reform and protracted security challenges will shape Africa in the coming year. Interest from European, Asian and Gulf countries is likely to grow as they scramble to secure cobalt, copper and other minerals needed for the energy transition. 

This could offer opportunities to reshape industrial supply chains and strengthen Africa’s economy, which continues to struggle with high youth unemployment, sluggish productivity and rising debt. Partnerships in the Democratic Republic of Congo–Zambia ‘cobalt-copper belt’ are likely to expand in 2026, supported by greater investment in battery, refining and transport-corridor projects.

The Gulf states – led by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar – are emerging as long-term economic partners across the continent, and are expected to continue investing in infrastructure, ports, logistics corridors, agriculture and energy. This reflects the growing recognition that Africa’s markets, resources and maritime routes will be central to global trade flows.

Key elections in Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia could be affected as younger generations continue to demand public scrutiny and political accountability.

Tighisti Amare, director of the Africa Programme.

Next year, growth across the continent is expected to remain resilient, albeit uneven, with East Africa approaching 6 per cent in select economies. West Africa will continue to diversify through industrial expansion and energy investment. Yet challenges remain. Protracted conflicts, most urgently the war in Sudan, will continue to destabilize the region. Escalating violence and stalled US-led mediation efforts risk deepening Sudan’s humanitarian crisis, which has displaced 12 million people. Addressing these problems will require renewed political will at a time when international engagement is fragmented and development assistance is falling. 

The Gen Z-led protests across Kenya, Tanzania and Madagascar in 2024 and 2025 exposed growing dissatisfaction with entrenched elites, rigged elections and social inequalities. Elections in Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia could be affected in 2026 as younger generations demand public scrutiny and political accountability.

Tighisti Amare is director of the Africa Programme

International law: A Global South reckoning 

The international rule of law has been severely tested over the past year. The failure to address the conflict in Gaza on the same terms as the West’s response to Ukraine has prompted many states in the Global South to distance themselves from core human rights and humanitarian principles. 

Meanwhile, Donald Trump has encouraged more unilateral approaches by extending his coercive tariff campaign, deploying lethal military force against alleged drug traffickers in Venezuela and applying targeted sanctions against international civil servants deemed to be acting against US interests. The question for 2026 is whether the international system can show sufficient resilience in defending the rule of law. 

A new alliance of countries from the Global South – the Hague Group – was formed in January 2025 to hold Israel accountable for alleged violations of international law in Palestine. This year, the group is expected to gain momentum by supporting the

implementation of decisions from both the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court on Palestine. The ICJ may also issue a long-awaited ruling on Myanmar’s alleged forced displacement of its Rohingya minority in another case brought by The Gambia. Progress is also possible in ICC cases concerning potential war crimes in Gaza and Ukraine. 

Uncertainties linger, however. Can international trade withstand the rise of unilateralism and resist interference with free trade? Will the West be able to persuade other states that humanitarian principles are universal concerns, rather than tools of intervention into the domestic affairs of states? And can confidence be restored in the prohibition of the use of force by ending the violence in Ukraine or by preventing new wars elsewhere?  The answers to these questions will shape the course of international law in 2026.

Marc Weller is director of the International Law Programme

Latin America: Venezuela braces

Latin America faces another tumultuous election year, which is likely to be marked by the volatility and political polarization that defined the end of 2025. In Chile, the far-right José Antonio Kast defeated his communist opponent in December’s presidential election, ushering in the country’s most conservative government since the dictatorship ended in 1990.

In Peru, more than 30 candidates are registered to compete for April’s presidential election. Whether it will stabilize Peruvian politics – which has seen eight presidents forced out by impeachment or the threat of it in the past nine years – is another question. The next month, Colombia will hold its presidential elections to replace the unpopular leftist President Gustavo Petro, who is constitutionally prohibited from running for a second term. 

If Trump follows through on threats to remove the Venezuelan president, the repercussions for regional security would be seismic.

Chris Sabatini, senior fellow for Latin America.

Brazil’s general election in October will see President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva run for a fourth term. His right-wing populist predecessor Jair Bolsonaro is barred from standing after being sentenced to more than 27 years in prison in November for plotting a military coup. But a Lula victory is by no means assured, especially if Bolsonaristas can rally behind a consensus candidate. 

The next year will also determine the direction of Argentine President Javier Milei’s aggressive economic reforms, after he secured an ‘economic stabilization’ deal with US President Donald Trump in late 2025. In Mexico, President Claudia Sheinbaum’s controversial programme to elect all federal judges will face a reckoning – June will mark a year since they were elected. 

Serious security challenges linger across the region, from Haiti’s worsening humanitarian crisis to Ecuadorian President Alvaro Noboa’s struggle to quell gang violence. The most consequential security issue, however, is the Trump administration’s use of lethal military force against alleged Venezuelan drug traffickers. If the administration follows through on threats to remove Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro the repercussions for regional security would be seismic.

Christopher Sabatini is senior fellow for Latin America

Europe: Can the centre hold? 

Ukraine will remain Europe’s fault line in 2026. Support for Kyiv will be tested by political fatigue in European Union capitals, increasing uncertainty about United States commitments and the economic strain of prolonged military and financial aid. 

But other tensions will persist. First, rising populism threatens to erode the political centre in major European democracies and stall EU political integration. The electoral momentum of far-right parties will be tested when Denmark, Hungary, Slovenia and Sweden hold parliamentary elections in 2026. 

How might Russian influence campaigns exploit Bulgarian ambivalence about joining the eurozone in January and its presidential election in November?

Grégoire Roos, director of the Europe and Russia and Eurasia Programmes

Bulgaria will also be a source of concern. How might Russian influence campaigns exploit ambivalence about joining the 

eurozone in January and a presidential election scheduled for November? Second, opposition towards the energy transition is likely to grow as voters feel the bite of rising energy costs and carbon-intensive industries struggle to cut emissions while staying competitive.

In January the EU’s carbon pricing tool for goods entering the single market will come into force, but national-level political pressure may lead to significant exemptions for key sectors and trading partners. 

Europe’s relationship with China sits against this backdrop. On the one hand, Europe must maintain trade links with the world’s biggest producer of solar power and other low-carbon equipment; on the other, it must tighten security and technology controls. This balancing act will not become any easier in 2026.

The May summit of the European Political Community, taking place in Yerevan, 

Armenia, will be an important touchpoint. As various leaders and heads of states gather, Europe’s ability to diversify its strategic alliances and recognize the role of Western and Central Asia in bolstering regional security will be put to the test.

Grégoire Roos is director of the Europe and Russia and Eurasia Programmes

OrysiaLutsevych OBE, Deputy Director, Russia and Eurasia Programme; Head of the Ukraine Forum.

Dr Sanam Vakil,Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme

This article was originally published on Chatham House.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.