Bangladesh’s Democratic Transition: Learning from Tunisia’s Failed Promise

When protests erupted on Bangladesh’s streets in July 2024, toppling the Awami League after 15 years of increasingly authoritarian rule, many observers reached for historical parallels. The most seductive comparison was Tunisia — the sole “success story” of the Arab Spring, whose 2014 Constitution won international acclaim and whose civil society mediators earned a Nobel Peace Prize.

Yet Tunisia’s democratic experiment collapsed within a decade. President Kais Saied suspended parliament in 2021 and imposed a new constitution that centralized power around his office. The celebrated transition had proven more decorative than transformative, a sobering lesson for Bangladesh’s interim government as it navigates its own democratic opening.

Tunisia’s Hollow Victory

Tunisia’s initial success rested on genuine achievements. The 2014 Constitution was the Arab world’s most progressive charter, enshrining gender equality, religious freedom, and carefully balanced institutions. The National Dialogue Quartet — comprising labor unions, business groups, lawyers, and human rights activists — successfully mediated the political crises that could have derailed the transition entirely.

But constitutional poetry obscured policy prose. The socio-economic rights that reflected the revolution’s original demands — triggered by fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation after humiliation by corrupt officials — were aspirational rather than justiciable. They lacked enforcement mechanisms, budgets, or deadlines.

More critically, Tunisia’s transition prioritized political procedures over economic delivery. Under donor pressure, Tunis adopted orthodox austerity: subsidy cuts, public sector wage restraint, and privatization. Growth slowed sharply, youth unemployment approached one-third of the labor force, and household budgets buckled under rising costs.

The promised institutions — constitutional courts, anti-corruption watchdogs, independent commissions — remained largely on paper. Patronage networks adapted to the new situation rather than disappeared. Citizens learned to navigate the new system much as they had the old: through connections, not constitutional rights.

Bangladesh’s Parallel Challenges

Bangladesh’s July uprising exhibited similar dual demands: political liberalization and economic relief. Like Tunisia, Bangladesh faces the challenge of oligarchic networks that transcend regime change, having concentrated control over land, logistics, and procurement under the previous government.

Yet Bangladesh operates under different constraints and advantages. Its economy is larger and more globally integrated, particularly through the ready-made garment (RMG) sector that employs over 4 million workers. The country has achieved impressive social development gains over two decades — widespread primary education, declining maternal mortality, and rising female workforce par

However, structural vulnerabilities — narrow export concentration, energy price exposure, financial sector governance gaps, and saturated informal employment — persist. Urban wages have eroded under inflation while youth unemployment has swelled—creating conditions ripe for the disillusionment that ultimately consumed Tunisia’s democratic experiment.

Learning from Tunisia’s Mistakes

Bangladesh’s path forward requires addressing five critical areas where Tunisia failed. First, democratic transitions succeed when citizens experience tangible improvements in daily life. Bangladesh must sequence reform to deliver visible relief first: targeted cash transfers for the poorest quartile, wage support for low-income formal workers, labor-intensive public works with community oversight, and lifeline utility tariffs that cushion vulnerable households. Tunisia inverted this logic — imposing austerity first with promises of later payoffs that never materialized.

Second, rather than simply replacing faces at the top, Bangladesh must pursue structural de-concentration through transparent e-procurement systems, beneficial ownership registries for government contractors, empowered competition authorities, and digitized land records that reduce corruption premiums. Criminal prosecutions of high-profile figures matter symbolically, but systemic reforms change incentives across the economy, making compliance easier and capture costlier.

Third, Tunisia won a Nobel Prize before establishing a constitutional court, a telling inversion of priorities. Bangladesh should front-load judicial credibility through merit-based appointments, fixed budgets, and case management systems. Similarly, professional election commissions and genuinely independent anti-corruption bodies require immediate attention. International recognition follows domestic legitimacy, not the reverse.

Fourth, while fiscal repair may be necessary, rote austerity often proves self-defeating in democratic transitions. Bangladesh should sequence reforms to pair subsidy rationalization with targeted protection, broaden tax bases through digitization rather than squeezing formal wages, and negotiate with creditors for phased conditionalities that preserve pro-poor spending during adjustment periods.

Finally, authoritarianism rarely returns with fanfare. It typically arrives wearing the uniform of “efficiency.” Bangladesh needs friction-generating institutions: meaningful judicial review, parliamentary committees with subpoena power, press protections that are defended rather than merely declared, and civil society organizations with legal standing to contest abuses.

Regional and Global Stakes

Bangladesh is not a peripheral player in global affairs. With 170 million people, it ranks as the world’s second-largest garment exporter and sits at the intersection of South and Southeast Asian trade networks. Whether the democratic transition succeeds or fails will influence regional stability, global supply chains, migration patterns, and climate adaptation financing.

There’s also a narrative dimension. Tunisia’s reversal has reinforced arguments — common in policy circles — that democracy is a luxury developing countries cannot afford. A Bangladesh that delivers jobs and justice alongside political rights could rebut this claim with evidence rather than slogans.

The Dignity Test

Tunisia’s tragedy stemmed not from constitutional defects or foreign interference, but from a fundamental failure to address the grievances that sparked revolution: unemployment, corruption, and everyday humiliation by state authorities. When democracy was experienced as higher prices and slower services, citizens concluded it was a language for elites rather than a tool for ordinary people.

Bangladesh’s interim government faces the same test. Will democracy mean a garment worker keeping her job through economic downturns, a farmer receiving payment without corrupt middlemen, a journalist questioning officials without fear of reprisal? These are the victories that outlast international praise and survive political cycles.

The world will applaud when Bangladesh holds credible elections or passes elegant reforms. But lasting success requires building the court before seeking the prize, putting food on tables before polishing constitutional texts. Without delivering dignity — jobs, justice, services — neither elections nor constitutions will matter.

Bangladesh has the advantage of hindsight. Tunisia’s hollow spring need not be a prologue to Bangladesh’s winter of discontent, if Dhaka treats dignity as the central metric of democratic success.

This article was originally published on The Diplomat.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.