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After junta leader Min Aung Hlaing met Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his August-September visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin and the WWII Victory parade in Beijing, the regime has stepped up diplomatic and military engagement with its two neighbouring powers under the banner of “bilateral relations.”

In the case of China, the junta dispatched multiple delegations to strengthen ties. On September 14, the junta’s Prime Minister Nyo Saw, accompanied by senior officials, attended the 22nd China-ASEAN Expo in Nanning. Nyo Saw held talks with Chinese Vice President Han Zheng, during which they discussed bilateral relations. On the same day, the junta sent a delegation led by Myo Thant, the minister of Construction, to attend the ASEAN-China Ministerial Roundtable on Construction in China’s Guilin city. On September 17, the junta’s Defense Minister General Maung Maung Aye participated in the 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum. He also met with the Chinese Defence Minister, Admiral Dong Jun and visited advanced military technology companies in Beijing, observing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs) production, aviation technology equipment, electronic warfare systems, and air defense technology weapons.

With India, engagement similarly increased. On September 11, a high-ranking military delegation led by Lieutenant General Ko Ko Oo, Commander of the Bureau of Special Operations-1 (BSO-1), travelled to New Delhi to meet India’s Chief of Army Staff, General Upendra Dwivedi. Discussions centered on strengthening bilateral defence cooperation and expanding military-to-military relations. The delegation also toured the Eastern Command in Kolkata. Shortly after, on September 16, another Myanmar military team led by Colonel Zar Ni Aung, comprising 120 officials, visited India. On the same day, reciprocally, an Indian Armed Forces delegation comprising 120 officials led by Colonel Shrikant Jethi visited Myanmar.

The key question is: why is the junta intensifying its ties with these two countries?

Three primary factors explain the junta’s accelerated engagement with China and India.

First, the junta seeks military support to counter the expanding resistance movement. China remains its principal arms supplier, providing systems such as FTC-2000G light fighter jets, Y-12 and K-8 trainer aircraft, UAVs, vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) drones, CH-3/CH-3A reconnaissance drones, Type 053H1 frigates, Type 92 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), which have enhanced the junta’s operational capacity. From India, according to Justice for Myanmar, the junta has obtained artillery components, communication systems, naval and marine parts, remote weapon stations and air defense systems, as well as fuel, lubricants, spare parts, and dual-use items.

The junta is actively pursuing increased military assistance from both countries in order to suppress the expanding resistance movement, particularly the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) operating under the command structure of the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG has repeatedly announced preparations for a nationwide offensive against the regime, while also calling for a boycott of the junta’s forthcoming elections. The territory covered by the vote is expected to shrink further before the polls due to sustained offensives by the PDFs. For instance, on September 20, PDFs seized control of Banmauk town in Sagaing Region, eliminating another regime constituencies. The junta had already announced that elections would not be held in 121 constituencies across the country.

Thus, the NUG’s dual strategy of military action and election boycott poses a major challenge to the regime, making additional military support crucial for the junta to counter anticipated offensives and retain control.

Second, the junta seeks political endorsement, particularly regarding its planned elections. During meetings with Chinese and Indian leaders, Min Aung Hlaing emphasised electoral preparations in a bid to secure their backing. Neither Beijing nor New Delhi has explicitly endorsed the junta’s vote, with both refraining from any formal statements of support.

During his meeting with junta Foreign Minister Than Swe in Anning on August 14, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi remarked that elections could promote three goals—peace, national reconciliation, and economic development. However, his remarks amounted to a symbolic gesture, falling short of any explicit pledge of Chinese support for the junta’s poll plan. Similarly, during his meeting with Min Aung Hlaing in China, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi underscored that elections must be fair, inclusive, and involve all stakeholders, thereby emphasizing India’s broader democratic principles.

The absence of explicit endorsement has prompted the junta to intensify its diplomatic outreach in pursuit of firmer backing. The Union Election Commission (UEC) has begun promoting the elections as “free and fair” while inviting China and India to send election observers, thereby seeking to legitimize the process. For example, on September 19, UEC Chairman Than Soe met Indian Ambassador Abhay Thakur in Naypyitaw to present the commission’s electoral preparations and formally invite Indian observation. A similar invitation to the Chinese ambassador is expected soon. These accelerated engagements underscore the junta’s strategy to secure political recognition from both China and India.

Third, the junta is seeking Chinese and Indian leverage over ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to quell the ongoing armed conflict. The regime expects China to exert pressure on groups such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to halt their offensives, while encouraging other EAOs to stabilize border security and facilitate the election process. Some gains have already materialized: Following Chinese pressure and mediation, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) signed a truce in January, enabling the regime to retake northern Shan State’s capital Lashio. MNDAA leaders visited China last Friday at the invitation of Special Envoy Deng Xijun, amid expectations of increased pressure to relinquish their hold on the Shan town of Hseni.

Similarly, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), at China’s bidding, curtailed its financial and military support to the TNLA, MNDAA, and Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army (SSPP/SSA).

The regime also expects Beijing to pressure the KIA to cease hostilities and withdraw from Bhamo, where intense fighting has persisted for over nine months, and to restrain the Arakan Army (AA) from launching offensives on Kyaukpyu, a hub of Chinese Belt & Road investment. From New Delhi, the junta seeks stricter regulation of border crossings and trade routes—particularly in Rakhine and Chin states, where resistance groups maintain strongholds—and Indian support in deterring an AA offensive against the Rakhine capital of Sittwe.

The junta calculates that Chinese and Indian leverage can reduce, if not entirely halt, hostilities with the EAOs. Even a partial reduction in armed clashes would significantly boost the regime’s efforts to stage elections. Hence, its push to escalate engagements with both countries.

In fact, elections are necessary to solve Myanmar’s ongoing political crisis—but only if they are free and fair, not orchestrated to extend military rule under the guise of democracy.

Instead of endorsing the junta’s electoral roadmap, China and India should pressure the junta either to amend the 2008 Constitution’s 25 percent military quota in parliament or engage in genuine negotiations with opposition actors, including the NUG and EAOs. Without such political reforms, elections are unlikely to end the civil war and will yield little strategic benefit for either Beijing or New Delhi.

Joe Kumbun is the pseudonym of an independent political analyst.

This article was originally published on The Irrawaddy. 
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.