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Russia and Ukraine last met for talks in March. Since then, the war has entered a new phase and neither side seems open to a peace built on negotiated concessions. So what now?

OVER six months after Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border, Vladimir Putin’s ‘special military operation’ is bogged down along a line from the suburbs of Karkhiv to the shores of the Black Sea, with fighting centred in the Donbass region. The end of hostilities is nowhere in sight: since talks in Istanbul on 29 March, diplomatic efforts to end the war have been at a standstill and negotiating positions have hardened.

Russia had already set out its demands at a preparatory meeting on 10 March in the Turkish seaside resort of Antalya. In return for a ceasefire, it expected Ukraine to recognise its sovereignty over Crimea and the independence of the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (formally recognised by Putin in a televised speech on 21 February). Russia also demanded that Ukraine adopt a ‘non-bloc status’ and abandon its ambition to join NATO (written into the constitution, which would need amending); recognise Russian as the second state language; and ban all ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi political parties and organisations, and repeal laws that glorify historical figuresRussia considers contentious. In short, Russia expected Ukraine to capitulate. Ukraine, for its part, demanded an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian forces from all of its territory, including Crimea.

The Istanbul talks only lasted three hours, but the Russian delegation came away optimistic: Ukraine, realising it could not count on direct military intervention by NATO, and even less on fast-track membership, had drawn up a document outlining its proposals for armed neutrality, adopting a ‘non-bloc and non-nuclear status’.

Ukraine undertook not to host foreign military bases or foreign troops permanently. In return, it demanded international security guarantees. Suggested guarantors were the permanent members of the UN Security Council (including Russia), plus Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland and Israel. The guarantees would exclude Crimea and certain parts of the Donbass, so as not to put potential guarantors on a collision course with Russia.

What these security guarantees would involve specifically is unclear.Was Ukraine trying to build in a collective responsibility clause — seeking commitment to an automatic military response to any attack, on the lines of article 5 of the NATO treaty? In the event of an ‘aggression’ or ‘armed attack’, the proposals called for the guarantors to assist Ukraine through ‘individual or joint actions’, including ‘the provision of necessary weaponry and the use of armed force’.

There were other problems for Russia. The peace agreement was to be approved by a referendum in Ukraine. But what if were rejected? There were to be bilateral negotiations on Crimea over a period of 15 years, yet Russia considered the issue closed since its annexation of the peninsula in spring 2014. 

Diplomatic efforts halted

Russia felt Ukraine’s concessions were insufficient. And when evidence of a massacre in Bucha emerged on 1 April, the Ukrainian delegation withdrew. In Moscow and Kyiv, those in favour of war prevailed and diplomatic efforts ground to a halt. Russia accused the UK and US of telling Volodymyr Zelensky to sign nothing and choose the military option. Ukraine condemned Russia for issuing ultimatums. After Istanbul, negotiators only met online, to arrange exchanges of prisoners and bodies or to organise humanitarian corridors.

Since then, the war has entered a new phase. Speaking in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, in June, Putin said the special military operation would continue until the Donbass had been fully liberated and security conditions appropriate for Russia established. No deadlines would be set, to avoid creating false expectations.

The course of the war depends to a large extent on what happens away from the front. Both belligerents are certain they are on the right side of history, and that time is on their side. But for how long?

Russia’s strategy is now to concentrate on pushing its front line forward, while continuing to strike at military objectives and civilian infrastructure deep inside Ukraine, wearing down its economic resources and morale. The idea is to nibble away at Ukraine’s territory and create conditions that will eventually persuade it to negotiate on Russia’s terms. If talks don’t take place, or if they fail after Moscow has taken full control of the Donbass, Russia could launch a new operation, aimed at controlling Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, starting with the port of Mykolaiv at the mouth of the Bug river. Another possibility is taking complete control of Zaporizhzhia oblast (an important region for Ukrainian industry and agriculture). In April a senior Russian military figure said the aim was to establish a land corridor from Russia to Transnistria. This may be difficult with the current balance of military power, but if successful would cut off Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea.

Resistance in the Donbass

Kyiv’s strategy is to exhaust Russia’s military resources through continued resistance in the Donbass and preventing the region from falling entirely into Moscow’s hands. The capture of Lysychansk in early July enabled Russian and pro-Russian forces to take full control of Luhansk oblast; but around half of Donetsk oblast, including the cities of Bakhmut, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, has not yet fallen.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s growing arsenal of Western weaponry — including Caesar truck-mounted howitzers from France, HIMARS rocket launchers from the US and PzH 2000 tank howitzers from Germany — should make possible a long-awaited counteroffensive on Kherson, which Zelensky’s spokesman, Oleksiy Arestovych, said was due this summer. If successful, it will show Ukrainians and the West that victory is possible and financial and military assistance has not been in vain. This will be all the more important as winter approaches, and Europe feels the growing cost of sanctions.

For Ukraine, the goal of negotiations is to have Russia withdraw to the positions it occupied on 24 February, with minimal concessions, such as adopting armed neutrality in exchange for international security guarantees.

So far, neither side wants a ceasefire. In March it seemed Russia might withdraw from Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts in exchange for concessions from Ukraine. That now appears unlikely. Moscow also seems to have abandoned the idea of creating ‘people’s republics’ in these newly captured territories: this approach failed in the Donbass because Kyiv did not implement the Minsk accords, under which Donetsk and Luhansk were to be part of a new federal Ukraine.

Meanwhile Russia has begun absorbing the newly captured territories, which Sergey Kiriyenko from the presidential administration has visited several times this spring and summer. The rouble has been in use there since late May, and the process for issuing Russian passports to Ukrainian residents has been simplified by presidential decree. Preparations are under way for a referendum on accession to Russia, possibly on 11 September, when other voting will take place within Russia itself.

Meanwhile in the Donbass, a Russian delegation visited Luhansk oblast in early August to prepare for a referendum on acceding to Russia. That seems premature in Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts, which are only partly under Russian control. If Russia absorbs these regions, what will happen if Ukraine carries out strikes? Russia has already said that any use of Western artillery on Russian territory, or territory Moscow considers Russian, will lead to strikes on decision-making centres in Ukraine, such as the parliament building or presidential palace.

The cost of keeping Ukraine going

The future course of the war depends to a large extent on what happens away from the front. Both belligerents are certain they are on the right side of history, and both think time is on their side. But for how long? Ukraine is counting as much on the cumulative impact of sanctions as on arms deliveries.Russia hopes that the West’s financial support for Ukraine will dwindle and the country will collapse economically or even politically.Inflation is soaring in Europe as a result of Western embargoes, and Russia is making things worse by restricting gas exports to Europe. Ukraine has pleaded with Germanyto speed up delivery of its promised economic and military aid . In April Zelensky said his country needed $7bn a month to keep it going ; in July his economic advisor Oleg Ustenko indicated the figure was now $9bn .

Russia sees no alternative but to continue its war. Sanctions will remain in place no matter what, so there is nothing to gain from suspending operations at this stage.

In Kyiv, those in favour of war probably think they can go back to the state of quasi-open conflict with Russia that prevailed between 2014 and 2022, but with international guarantees of Ukraine’s security. Neither side seems keen for a peace built on negotiated concessions. Both would prefer a peace imposed by force (despite the inherent risk of instability and desire for revenge), which would end the conflict on terms they believe favour their interests:security and territorial integrity for Ukraine; security and Ukraine’s neutrality for Russia.

How far do Ukraine’s objectives coincide with those of NATO countries providing military assistance (without which it would probably not have survived this long)? Western financial and military aid aims to prevent the collapse of Ukraine’s armed forces and government. What is the ultimate goal? The White House originally said (though the State Department later denied) that it was regime change in Russia , while the Pentagon wants to see the Russian military ‘weakened’ on the battlefield . The UK wants a barrier to contain Russia, running from the North Sea to the Black Sea. This harks back to the ‘balance of power’ concept that has shaped British policy in Europe for centuries . The EU is divided: Eastern Europe wants a firm stance against Russia, while the countries of ‘old Europe’ (including France) are wary of backing Russia into a corner.

One thing is certain: resolving the conflict in Ukraine will be an important step towards the establishment of a new security order in Europe, which is already under way. 

Igor Delanoë is deputy director of the Franco-Russian Observatory in Moscow.

This article was originally published on Le Monde diplomatique.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.